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Summary
Within Popo society in Pointe Noire, Congo, fishermen
seIl their fish to their wives at a price slightly below the
local market price. The wives proeess the fish and re-seIl
it in distant markets, making a profit they mainly re-invest
in their husbands' fishing activities. The present paper
investigates this specific economic house hold organisation
in order to reveal the mechanisms produeing and
preserving it. To accommodate the analysis the access
regime, describing the distributions of rights as well as
the different actors' ability to act upon their rights, is
introduced and defined. An important insight generated
by the analysis is how particular institutions exist to serve
the economic interests of dominant groups in the society.
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Introduction1
African households show a diversity of structural and organisational forms. The
present paper addresses the specific household organisation found among the Popo
fishermen of Pointe-Noire, Congo. Within this society, men are full-time fishermen,
operating either as owners of boats and nets or as workers in different contractual
relationships with an owner. The fish caught are sold to the wives of the fishermen, to
a price slightly below the local market price. The women proeess the fish and seIl
them in distant city markets, making a profit they mainly re-invest in their husband's
fishing activities. The objective of this paper is to analyse the observed social
organisation in order to unveil the mechanisms produeing and preserving the existent
social order. More specifically we are interested in finding the explanations as to why
men choose to seIl the fish to their wives at a reduced price and why women confine
themselves to supply credit to their husbands.
The paper proceeds in the following way. The discussion consists of four parts. First
an outline of the present social organisation in the Popo society of Pointe-Noire,
Congo, is given. The outline is based on the work of Jul-Larsen (1994) and describes
the development of the institutional arrangement from the arrival of Pop o fishermen in
Congo in the sixties until today. In the second part the analytical concept access
regime is introduced and defined. The access regime describes both the distribution of
rights existing within a society and the different individuals' ability to act up on their
i I would like to thank Eyol Jul-Larsen for presenting me to the material, urging me to analyse it from
an economic point of view and always weIcoming my man y questions regarding the social organisation
of the Pop o fishermen of Pointe-Noire, Congo. I would also like to thank Gisela Geisler, Trond Olsen,
Bjørn Sandvik and Steinar Vagstad for insightful comments.
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rights. The access regimes existing within the Popo society result in principal-agent
relationships between owners and workers and between husbands and wives. This
being the case, the third part analyses the exact relationship existing between owners
and workers and husbands and wives respectively, and examines why they differ. In
the last part a model explaining the existent organisational structure as the outcome of
rational economic optimisation over time, is presented.
The Popo social organisation
Originally from Benin, the Pop o society of Pointe-Noire, Congo, constitutes an easily
identifiable group of about 1000 fishermen and 200-300 wives who live and work in
separate vilage clusters outside the town centre. Both in relation to Popo fisheries in
Benin as well as to local canoe fisheries in Congo, their produetion is characterised by
a high level of specialisation and market-oriented produetion based on capital
intensive technology. With few exception all the men are full time fishermen. The
Popos have specialised in fishing of pelagic fish at open sea using driftnets from big
motorised canoes. Each productive unit (canoe + nets) is operated by a male
production unit, the company. The productive units are owned either individually or
collectively by Popo fishermen. Dependent upon the number of owners and the
number of owners actually fishing, the majority of companies also employ Popo
workers who stay in different types of client relationships with the owners/chief of the
company. In addition non-Popo labour, in the form of young local Vili workers, are
used to different degrees by the companies. Vili workers are, however, considered less
reliable than Pop o workers.
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The companies seIl their catch immediately after it is landed on the beach. The income
derived is shared among the fishermen according to a 50-50 share between means of
produetion (capital) and labour. The labour share is divided among the company
members according to a lot system. The owners take their part in the labour share
provided they participate in produetion.
When the fish is sold on the beach the price is normally set by Congolese traders early
in the morning. By far the greatest part, however, is sold to Popo women, wives of the
crew members, at a somewhat lower price pr. unit. In principle every woman married
to a crew member has the right to the same amount of fish from the canoe of her
husband. In practise, however, it is an advantage to be the wife of an owner/company
chief.
Each woman, whether she is the only wife or a co-wife, constitutes her own economic
unit. She has her own ovens for smoking of fish and her own staff of young
Congolese helpers. The smoked fish is sold in the markets of the nearby towns. For
every female proeessor, access to fish is important and in order to increase her
supplies she can buy pelagic fish from a small industrial fleet. She can also supply
credit to her husband in order to enhance his productive capacity or she can get access
to fish from another canoe by providing credit to the owner(s) of this canoe. In return
for the credit the woman has the right to buy a certain share of the fish landed by the
credit financed company at the reduced price.
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To buy the boats and nets needed to create a company, financial means exceeding the
Pop o fishermen's cash funds are required. A fisherman or groups of fishermen
wishing to establish a new unit, therefore, normally have to rely on some kind of
credit. The first Pop o fishermen arriving in 1967 established fishing companies based
on partnership or co-ownership among the fishermen involved and financed their
outlays by credit supplied by their extended families in Benin. The limited amount of
available credit back home, however, and the fact that only scant repayments took
place, resulted in home areas drying up as a founding source during the 1970.
The drying up created a need for additional sources of credit. The Congolese traders,
to whom the fishermen originally sold their catehes, were no alternative as they only
bought limited volumes of fish and were reluctant to give credit to the Pop o
fishermen. The solution came through the wives. Wives brought over from Benin
immediately took up smoking and re-seIling of fish and soon made good profits. The
women' sprocessing capacity soon exceeded the amounts they could buy from their
husbands. In order to increase their access to fish, therefore, women started investing
in the fisheries. These investments increased the quantities caught and established
buying-rights on part of the credit-supplying women. Credit supplied to the company
of her husband increases the share allotted to the credit supplying wife relative to the
shares of the other wives in the company. Credit supplied to outside companies gives
the creditor the right to a given share of the catches of these companies. The number
of other women with whom she has to share the catch is of main concern for a female
creditor. No woman can under any cIrcumstance c1aim more fish in a company than
the share belonging to the wife (or the wives) of the chief. These share(s) depend upon
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the total number of wives in the company. The lower the number of wives, the larger
each share and the more attractive it wil be for a woman to give credit to a company.
Due to the interests of the creditors, therefore, as time went by the egalitarian
organisation of co-ownership was replaced by a more hierarchical order characterised
by one/few owners con trollng companies consisting of contracted, unmarried
workers. The owners found the women's supply of credit attractive as it did not
include interests or repayments dates. It is only if and when a woman decides to
renounce her right to buy fish that the question of repayment becomes relevant.
The social organisation within the Popo society is thus characterised by men bein g
full-time fishermen, either canoe owners (co-owners) or workers. The fish caught are
sold to the wives at a price slightly below the local market price. The wives proeess
the fish and re-seIl it in the cities of the region, making a profit they partly re-invest in
the fishing activity. Men and wives keep separate accounts, each contributing
individually to household expenses. Despite this fact the economic dispositions of the
spouses are not completely disintegrated. Due to male dominance within the
household, the woman cannot decide on her economic transactions entirely
independent of her husband but is expected to take his interest into consideration
when acting. The major part of a woman's credit is thus directed towards her
husband's company and outside credit is supplied on ly with the permission of the
husband.
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The Access Regime
In order to capture the factors facilitating the observed social order, the concept access
regime is introduced and defined, and the access regime ex is ting within the Popo
society investigated. The access regime describes the distribution of rights between
different members of the society as well as the different individuals' ability to act
upon their rights. The distribution of rights depends on the existing property right
regimes whereas the ability to act upon one's right depends upon the actor controlling
the technology required to do so. The access regime can thus be seen as a
categorisation of different individual access situations. These access situations
depends upon a) the distribution of rights prevailing and b) the different individuals'
ability to utilise legally accessible resources.
Three types of property rights can be distinguished (Eggertson, 1990: 34). User rights
are defined as the potential uses of an asset that are legitimate for an individual,
including the right to transform physically or even destroy an asset. Income rights are
the rights to earn an income from an asset and to contract over the terms to other
individuals, and transfer rights refer to the right to transfer the asset permanently to
another party. These different forms of property right may prevail in different social
settings in time and space, or exist simultaneously within the same social setting at the
same time by different individuals holding different rights towards the same assets or
the same individual holding different types of rights towards different assets.
The ability to utilise accessible resources depends upon the user controlling the
technology required to do so. Lack of such control may render a de jure accessible
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resource de facto inaccessible. Consider deep sea fishing. No legal restrictions prevent
any individual from participating. In practice, however, only those with access to the
required fishing gear wil be able to act up on their right.
The access regime c1assifies access in terms of these two dimensions, property rights
and controlover technology. Dependent upon the number and types of property rights
defined and the dispersion of technology in the society, a multitude of access regimes
can be identified, not only across but also within societies as different access regimes
can exist for different members of the society.
We wil not go into the multitude of access regimes possible but, given the
distribution of rights and the technology requirements prevailing, focus on whether
members of the society can be said to be granted equal or unequal rights of property
and equal or unequal access to technology. To exemplify what we have in mind, let
us keep to the fishing example. First, assume all members of a vilage have equal
right to fish in a lake nearby. Given that fishing is done with home-made fishing
gear, all members have equal opportunity to utilise the lake. We define this access
regime egalitarian. Should fishing in the lake require expensive fishing gear
affordable by only a portion of the vilage members, a regime characterised by
technologically diferential access prevails. A legally diferential access regime is, on
the other hand, characterised by all members being technologically able to catch the
fish, but only some of them, e.g. the ones living along the shore, are allowed the right
to do so. Should only some of the shore residing people control the technology
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required, a legally and technologically diferential access regime can be said to exist.
The different access regimes defined are summarised in table 1.
Table 1. Access regimes
control
over
technology
equal
unequal
Equal
Egalitarian
Technologically
diferential
Distribution of rights
Unequal
Legally diferential
Legally and technologically
diferential
An egalitarian access regime represents common resource situations, where common
implies not only equallegal access but equal ability as well. In the existent literature
the legal aspect is given priority and egalitarian access regimes are traditionally
denoted open access or common property regimes. Open access implies no
restrictions on the use of the asset; whoever wants to utilise it can go ahead and do so.
Common property on the other hand restricts access to members of a specified group,
e.g. a lineage, vilage or nation. Common property is divided into unregulated and
regulated (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Unregulated common property limits the
access to members of the group but imposes no rules as to how these members are to
utilise the resource. Regulated common property both delimits the access and imposes
and enforces rules on the use of the resource. State property can in some respects be
regarded as an extended form of common property.
Common resources may in principle be utilised in an individualistic or collective
manner. In the open access and unregulated common property situations, collective
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action depends up on the individuals seeing it in their own interest to act collectively.
Within regulated common property collective action is supported by rules imposed
up on the individual by society. Of central importanee here, irrespective of whether
individualistie or collective action are dominating, is the fact that interaction between
users must be characterised as interaction between equals. Any patterns of conduct
which emerge are therefore restricted to the dass of equal player relations.
Differential access regimes on the other hand are characterised by some having
controlover resources while others have not. This applies irrespective of the
differential access regime being legally or technologically based. Private property,
characterised by some individuals legally controllng the resource, is example of a
legally differential access regime. Seen from the outside, from the larger society
incorporating entitled as well as non-entitled groups, a common p ropert y situation
may also give rise to legally differential access regimes. When focusing on
similarities and differences between groups rather than within groups, the main
differenee betweena private property and a common property regime is that the
owners in the latter are groups rather than individuals.
In differential access situations, relations between individuals controlling resources
and the rest normally develop. To relate our analysis to the economic literature, the
people con trolling the resources wIl in the following be called principals and the
others denoted agents.2 The principal-agent relationship can either be seen as the
2 Within economic theory the terms principal and agent traditionally define resource controllng and
non-con trolling actors in situations characterised by asymmetric information.
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principal letting the agent utilise the resource against some compensation, or as the
principal hiring the labour power of the agent in order to utilise the resource. A
landowner renting out his land on a fixed rent basis fits the first description whereas a
landowner employing wage labour to work the land fits the second. Output related
payments may also be c1assified according to this distinction. U sing share-cropping
and piece-rate payment as examples, we see that share-cropping falls into the first
category whereas piece-rates fall into the second.
Given the distinetion between egalitarian and differential access to resources, and the
different forms a relationship between principals and agents may take, our main
objective is to determine the access regimes that can be said to exist within the Popo
society and furthermore, given the access regimes, to reveal the exact relationship
existing between the members of society. Before pursuing this further, however, we
find it natural to relate our concept access regime to the economic literature on
institutions.
The term institutions is given two related but different meanings in the economic
literature. The first are institutions as rules of the game, providing the context in
which economic actors operate. Institutions define the terms under which the various
actors con front each other, influence their expectations and define their rights. As
such, institutions are constraints human beings impose on themselves in order to
reduce uncertainty and facilitate interaction (North, 1990). The sec ond interpretation
sees institutions as organisations, an area of activity within which the market does not
co-ordinate the activities of the paricipants (Wiliamson, 1975; 1985).
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We follow North in seeing institutions as rules of the game rather than as
organisations. We dep art from North, however, in our inquiries regarding the factors
determining these rules of the game. Where North points to culturally transmitted
values like codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions we, without
denying the influence exerted by such factors, focus on the prevailng access
regime(s). In our view, therefore, the access regime(s) can be seen as the layer situated
underneath the institutional framework influencing its characteristics.
The distinetion between access regimes and institutions can be exemplified by making
use of North's example which shows the distinetion between institutions and
organisations. North (1990:4) sees institutions as analogous to the rules of the game in
a competitive team sport and the teams playing according to these rules are the
organisations. This analogy gives us a good idea of the situation, but it does not cover
the total situation. It does not specify why people in a given society play one
particular game and not another. Why do they favour soccer and not baseball?
Transferred to the focus of analysis of this paper we find that institutions are the rules
of the household game. But how can we account for the diversity of such
organisational rules observed? It is to be able to address questions of this type that we
fin d it necessary to define and delineate the access regimes. The hypothesis it that the
access regimes prevailing within society influence and to a large degree determine the
institutions or organisational rules found.
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The Popo access regimes
Investigating the access regimes existing within the Popo society in Pointe-Noire, we
find that Popo fÏshermen who originate from Benin have to secure residenee and work
permits from local and central Congolese authorities in order to stay and work in
Congo. In principle, each man has to obtain a legal residenee and work permit on
individual basis. In practise however, only 1/5 of the Popo population possess such
permits as they are difficult to obtain at areasonable price. The majority base their
security upon collective rights negotiated by the Popo political institution
'I Association des Ressortissants Beninois' (ARB). As a collective institution, ARB
does not discriminate between Popo men, but work to secure the same immigration
status for all. Within the Popo society, therefore, legal access to the resources of the
sea are egalitarian among men.
The ability to utilise these resources, however, depends upon controlover working
capitallike canoes, motors and fishing nets. The financial outlays required to buy such
items pre vent all men from buying their own, thereby creating a technologically
differential access regime between them. Due to unequal controlover technology, a
principal-agent relationship is established between owners and workers. Within this
relationship, the owners rent out their equipment to the workers against a share of
total output as rent. The share-rule is a 50-50 income split between capital and labour.
Between the different workers utilising the same equipment, the dividing rule is a
equal share rule.
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The situation of Pop o women differs from that of the men as the women's residenee
and work permit are granted them as wives and not as individuals in their own rights.
Women, therefore, have no legal access to the fish resources of the immigrant country
but have to rely on their husbands' access. Related to controlover working capital,
women also face a different situation than men. Husbands, in the role of household
heads, have the right to control all the fishing capital of the household, regardless of
how it is attained. As aresult women are prohibited from becoming capital-owners.
Between men and women, therefore, a legally differentiated access regime is
established.
Since women are prevented from controllng the technology (and from acting as
workers), they have no direct access to the fish but are dependent upon their husbands
to get access. The relationship between husband and wife is thus analogous to the
situation between owners and workers in the sense that the husbands/owners can be
seen as principals and the wives/workers as agents. Within Popo society, therefore,
two types of principal-agent relationships exist: a technologically based relationship
between owners and workers and a legally based one between husbands and wives.
The Popo principal-agent relationship
The principal-agent relationship between owners and workers is a share-tenancy
relationship where the principal and the agent share the output according to an agreed
share-rule. Such output sharing arrangements are shown to be efficient in situations
characterised by asymmetric information problems, either due to the principallacking
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information about the agents ability to perform certain tasks (adverse seleetion) or his
actions when performing them (moral hazard). In the Popo case the owner may lack
information about his workers' actions either because, for one reason or another, he
prefers to stay ashore and not take part in the fishing activity or because he is
operating more than one canoe. In order to provide the incentives needed to induce the
workers to work hard, payment is related to output.
The relationship between husbands and wives on the other hand is a seller-buyer
relationship and not a traditional agency relation. Why is this so? Why do the men
prefer to seIl the fish to their wives rather than to design a more standard agency
relationship where the women act as their husband's sales agents? The rationale can
be investigated by drawing upon the distinetion between competing and
complementary activities and the degree of manipulation open to the agent. Two or
more activities are defined as competing when the performanee of one activity
prevents a person from performing the other(s). Typical competing activities are
activities that have to be performed at different places during the same time period. In
the Pop o fishing community, fish caught in the fishing season must be processed and
brought to the market while it is stil fresh. This implies, given that lei sure time is
constant, that time used to proeess and/or trade compete with fishing time.
Complementary or non-competing activities on the other hand, are activities which
often supplement each other and are easily performed by one person. Sequential
activities fall into this category. In agrarian societies, where crops are stored after
being harvested, growing and seIlng can be performed in sequence. SeIlng, therefore,
does not interfere with produetion and one person can easily perform both activities.
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When more than one activity has to be performed, delegation of different tasks to
different people may increase total return due to gains from specialisation.
Furthermore, given the presenee of competing activities, delegation may raise total
output further by reducing 'dead time' losses. We define a dead time loss as the time
required to make a person able to perform a given activity. This time is often constant
and independent of the time used to perform the activity itself. Transport time to and
from the market and/or the fishing banks are examples of such dead time losses.
Delegation, however, may incur costs as well as benefits. From an owners point of
view, the cost associated with letting someone else bring the goods to the marked,
include the risk of being cheated or the cost incurred by designing an incentive
scheme makng it not worthwhile to cheat. The possibility of being cheated and the
cost of designing an incentive scheme depend upon the principal' s ability to control
the actions of the agent. This control may be direct in the form of monitoring or
indirect through the use of signals.3
For competing activities, where the reduction of dead time losses makes up a big par
of the gain from delegation, direct monitoring may not be economically viable.
Control is thus dependent upon the use of signais. For signals to function as
controllng devices, however, they have to be objectively observable and not be
subject to manipulation by the agent. For sequential activities manipulation is deterred
by the principal being present observing the output.4 Output, therefore, becomes an
3 A combination of the two is also possible. A principal may hire a foreman monitoring the workers,
and use quantity of output produced etc. as signals of the foreman's labour input.
4 Within agrarian societies it is common for the landowner to be present at his share-crop rented land at
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objective, observable signal of labour input. Within Pop o society, the need to control
output may be the rationale for owners who control more than one canoe to stay
ashore rather than take par in the productive activities of one of the companies.
Staying on the beach where the fish is landed give the owners the opportunity to
control total output. Output, therefore, becomes an observable signal of labour input.
With regard to marketing the Popo fishermen face a different situation. As fishing and
sellng compete for the same time, the fishermen cannot both fish and/or control the
output and be present at the market place observing the income. Since sales-income is
a function of the quantity and quality of the processed fish as well as the women's
negotiating capability and the demand and supply conditions in far away markets, the
man has liUle or no information about total income deri ved. His lack of information
create room for manipulation in the form of under-reporting by the woman. Market
income, therefore, cannot function as a signal upon which he can design an agency
contract.5 The outcome is a seller-buyer relationship between the husband and
wife/wives.
In situations characterised by completely competing activities, therefore, delegation
wil take the form of a seller-buyer relationships. Too see this consider a principal
who controls a commodity x. He can either seIl the commodity in the local market at a
price p, or let someone seIl it for him at the price q in a more distant market. The
harvest time, observing or participating in the harvest.5 This situation differ from the traditional sales agent sItuation in the sense that a sales agent is seIlng
the product only indirectly. The customers direct their orders to the producer. In this way a sequential
situation is created, giving the producer/owner the ability to observe output thus making output an
observable signal of labour input.
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agent seIling the good in the distant market is entitled to a share a of total income
derived. The agent's income is thus given by r = aqx and the principal's by
¡Il = (1 - a)qx . The principal, however, lacks information about the true price at the
distant market. This lack of information make it possible for the agent to manipulate
the price in order to maximise her own welfare. The agent thus faces the maximisation
problem,
Max ¡W = aqx
(ql
s.t. (1- a )qx ~ px
The restriction reveals that the principal must get an income at least equal to his
alternative income in order to be wiling to let the agent bring the goods to the distant
market. Otherwise he wil choose to seIl it in the loe al market.
The agent' s first order condition is given by Â, = i~a' where Â, is the non-negative
lagrange multiplier. The first order condition shows that the far away market-price
reported by the agent is determined by the restriction alone. By solving the restriction
with respect to q we have q = i~a' The principal's income is equal to
¡Il = (i0~lr = px. Irrespective of the strategy chosen, the principal's income wil not
exceed the income derived by seIling the commodity in the local market. 6
6 We have for simplicity assumed a risk-neutral agent. The resuIt, however, is independent of the
agents risk attitude. A risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-loving agent would all find it optimal to
choose q such that the principal' sincome equals px.
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Furthermore, by seIling the commodity in the local market the principal avoids the
risk of being cheated by agents disappearing with the commodity or claiming that
allpart of it have been destroyed by accidents. In situations characterised by
competing activities preventing the principal from observing the output, a seller-buyer
relationship is superior to an output dependent arangement. Due to lack of control
devices, therefore, it is optimal for the husband to seIl the fish to his wife/wives. But
why does he seIl her the fish at a price below the local market price? This question is a
central topic addressed in the next section.
Model: Husband-consented credit supply
The Popo social organisation consists of independent men and women performing
individual economic activities, keeping individual accounts. Despite this atomistic
structure, a wife cannot dec ide on her economic dispositions entirely independent of
her husband. As a result the majority of a women's credit is directed towards her
husband's companies and credit to other canoe-owners is supplied only with the
consent of her husband. Why is this so? Has it something to do with the husband-wife
relationship or is it a reflection of more general patterns of human interaction?
In this section a formal model is presented which shows that in a longer time
perspective it is profitable a) for a wife to restrict herself to the directives of her
husband and b) for a man to seIl the fish to his wife at a price below the market price.
As a point of deparure it is assumed that the relationship between husband and wife is
the result of the legally differential access regime existing between men and women.
The access regime denies women the right to control the fish resources thus making
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them dependent on their husbands for access. A husband usually pays his wife's travel
costs from Benin to Congo and allows her the right to enter the proeessing and trade
in fish. Since the profit earned makes the wife relatively wealthy she becomes
economically independent of her husband. Why then, do Popo women stay
subordinate to their husbands? Why do they not choose to control their own,
independent companies as other women fish traders, e.g. the Fante women in Ghana
are doing (Overå, 1992). By controllng their own companies, the women would
obtain the right to the capital share of the catch. Economically, therefore,
subordination has its price.
The subordination of Popo women can to a large degree be explained by the fact that
the Popos are migrants in the Congo. As described earlier, Popo men receive
collective residenee permits through the Popo political organisation, ARB. This
political organisation does not interfere in family maUers, however, and the permits of
wives are therefore conditional up on their husbands' consent. The fact that women
lack individual work and residenee permits, gives the household heads the means
necessar to maintain the differential access regime. If wives, against the interests of
their husbands, establish their independent companies, they risk bein g sent back to
Benin and put out of business for good. Moreover, a husbands who sends his wife
back to Benin is not obliged to pay her the investment money back. In this respect,
therefore, the legally differentiated access regime existing between men and women is
due to the husband-wife relationship. It is, more specifically, due to the mariage rules
allowing husbands the right to sanction rule breaking behaviour, thereby keeping up
the legally differentiated access regime.
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A woman who wishes to become independent has the opportunity to divorce her
husband. This, however, would not help her become owner of independent companies
in Pointe Noir. The proeess of separation takes a long time and during this time the
husband decides over her and has the right to send her back to Benin. As a divorcee
the woman would not be able to retum to Pointe Noir and continue her economIc
activities. The ARB organisation ruling the Popo society in Pointe Noir would not
allow her back into society. Allowing a divorced womanback into the society of her
former husband is bound to result in conflcts. Since the society is interested II
keeping conflct levels low a divorced woman are not allowed to re-enter.
On the part of the husbands, the mere possibilty that women mIght start independent
companies is a threat they have to take seriously. By establishing their own companies
the women would direct their credit to these companies instead of to their hus band' s
companies thus reducing the men's catehes and income. The establishment of
independent companies would in addition influence the existing companies' supplyof
labour. In order to run a company, a given amount of labour is required. Given that
new companies are established by workers leaving their primary companies in order
to organise new ones, owners of existing companies would lose part of their work
force. To make up for the lost labour, the owners of the primary companies must
either utilise loe al Congolese workers who are considered unreliable or import new
Popo workers from Benin, paying the traveIling costs. The establishment of new
companies thus reduce the owners'/husbands' income in two ways; a) due to reduced
investments and thereby reduced catehes and b) due to the replacement costs of the
workers lost. An obvious strategy to counteract such a development is for the
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husbands to make it more profitable for their wives to direct their credit to the
companies controlled by them. SeIlng wives the fish to reduced prices is one way of
doing this.
The price reduction, however, is costly for the husbands as it directly reduces their
income. After having received the investment money, therefore, a husband might be
tempted to refuse to reduce the price. The wife must then be expected to claim her
investment money back in order to invest it in other types of "wife appropriate"
economic activities with higher returns. By sending his wife back the Benin the man
avoids paying her money back. By doing this, however, he cuts himself off from
future investments from his wife. He could in principle marr another wife later on
and bring her to Congo to enter the fish trading business. Such a strategy is a) costly
as it requires him to pay lots of travel money and b) has uncertain outcomes as the
word of his behaviour wil spread among the Popos back home. A new wife must thus
be expected to refuse to invest in his fishing activities as she knows that irrespective
of her behaviour she wil soon be sent back to Benin. In the following, therefore, a
man refusing to seIl the fish to his wife at a reduced price is assumed to be unable to
attract future investments from his wife/wives.7
The inability of ARB to interfere in family matters prevents the organisation from
being a third pary with power to sanction any explicit contract between husband and
wife. Implicit contracts are thus the only type of contracts available for spouses. The
7 A potential new wife's reaction to the return of a former wife depends up on the reason for this return.
It is only when the return is due to inappropriate behaviour on part of the husband she wil decide not
to invest in his company. This wiI not be the case when the return is due to inappropriate behaviour on
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contractual relationship between the spouses is as aresult assumed to be in the form
of an implicit contract.
The theory of repeated games with perfect/imperfect monitoring indicates that co-
operation in agency relations can be sustained within implicit contracts by
conditioning future patterns of co-operation on the history of the relations. The Popo
community at Pointe-Noire is a small, transparent community where the actions of all
the members of the society are eventually known by alL. Within Pop o society,
therefore, monitoring appears to be dose to perfeet. The model presented thus
assumes a perfeet and complete information economy where husband and wife live an
infinite number of periods and where each person has a time discount factor 8 ,
O=:8 =: 1.8
To simplify the analysis we concentrate on the owner-wife relationship and assume
each owner to have one wife only.9 The owners are furthermore assumed not to
participate in the fishing activities, rendering the owner's share equal to the capital
share, r, of the amount caught. In each period the man can either seIl his output to the
local Congolese trader at the local market price, p, or seIl it to his wife at a price
below the local market price. The catch per company at time t is assumed to be a
function of capital input in that period, Xl = ¡(ki). The capital stock each period
consist of the capital stock lett over from the previous period and investments at the
part of the former wife.8 Like everyone else, the Popo's do not enjoy an infinite lifespan. The results obtained from this
infinite-horison model, however, are equivalent to those obtained from a finite-horison model with a
constant probability of termination.9 A wife of a worker receives such a small part of the catch that she has a very small opportunity of
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start of the present period, ki = (1- ß )kt- + ii. The existing capita! stock is assumed
to depreciate at a given rate ß each period. The capital stock in the first period is
equal to ko.
The existing capital stock is owned and controlled by the owners whereas investments
each period are controlled by the women. The woman can choose between investing
in her husband' s company or in an independent company where she gets the right to
the capital share of output. Her investment in any period is a function of her income in
the previous period and her consumption requirements in this period. As both her
income and her consumption requirements are influenced by exogenous shocks (e.g.
the quantity and quality of fish caught, the price level in the city markets, the health
situation of the family etc.) the woman's actual investment in any period is a random
variable. Due to this randomness her husband cannot tell whether a small investment
in his company is due to exogenous factors or due to his wife investing in an
independent company. The husband learns about his wife's investments at the end of
the period when the woman, in order to reaps the benefits of her investment, has to be
at the beach publicly demanding her share of the independent company's catch.lO
The woman's choIce between investing in her husband's company or an independent
company depends on the benefits derived in either case. Since actual investments are
random, the benefits are calculated on the basis of expected investments each period.
becoming a creditor.
10 The point of disclosure might be postponed by the woman sending helpers to the beach to collect her
share of the catch. But in a small transparent society like Pointe Noire the woman financing the
independent company wIl be disclosed eventually.
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To simplify we assume the woman's expected investment to be equal to a given
amount i each period.11 If the woman chooses to co-operate and invest in her
husband's company, the expected catch of his company in period t is given by
x: ~ fl (i - ß Y k, + I - (I; ß y i L If, on the other hand, she decides to defect and
invest in an independent company, the catch of her hus band' s company in period t is
given by x; = fl(l- PY ka j . A woman investing in her husband's fishing activity
gets an output equal to (q - (p - d)Jrx; each period, where q is the price at the distant
city market and d the deduction in the local price she receives as a wife.12 13 By
financing an independent company, on the other hand, the woman gets the right to the
owner' s share of the investment induced output. As a wife she also retains the right to
buy her husband' s share of output from his companies. In the first period, therefore,
her output is equal to qrx~ + (q - (p - d))rxg , where x~ = 1(0.
Given that each owner pays his share of the replacernent cost resulting from workers
1eaving existing companies in order to establish independent ones, the number of
existing companies are unaffected by the establishment of independent ones. The
effect on total output is thus non-negative, x: + x; ;: x/c .14 As a result the woman's
Il By assuming the probability distribution of the factors influencing the woman's actual investment
any period, as weIl as her optimal investment profile over time, to be common knowledge, the
woman's optimal expected investment over time can be caIculated. Since our objective is not to
determine her optimal investment profile, but rather, given this profile, to investigate whether it pays
her to co-operate or defect, we simply assume her optimal expected investment each period to be equal
to i.
12 Given a seIler-buyer relationship the woman has no incentive to conceal the market price, q, in
distant markets.
13 It is assumed that the actors, lacking information about future prices, project the present price levels
into the future.14 Given that the owner would have established a new company with the same amount of capital
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stage output from financing an independent company exceeds her stage output from
financing her husband' s company.
A husband finding out that his wife is financing independent companies, can choose
to let her stay in business in Congo or send her back to Benin. In Benin the woman's
income is reduced to her reservation income leveL, w. By financing an independent
company the woman gets a higher income in the first stage, but given that the
financing triggers her deportation back to Benin, her outcome in every future stage
wil be equal to her reservation income leveL.15
A man prefers to seIl to Congolese traders if his wife finances independent workers,
prx~ )o (p - d)rx~ - tll. The last term captures the replacement cost, where tl
denotes the relative reduction in the owner's labour force, l, due to the establishment
of an independent company and c represent the replacement cost per unit labour. It is
assumed that co-operation is efficient, qrx~ )o prxid + w, and that cheating entails a
(. d) 16loss, qrx~)o qr x: + xi - tlcl . The agent prefers cheating to receiving her
reservation income leve!, qrx: + (q - (p - d))rx~ )o w.
equipment had he received the investment money, total output in an excIusively owner controlled
situation would be equal to totaloutcome in an situation with an independent company.
IS Several authors have argued that the game remaining after one side defects is identical to the game as
a whole, so equilibria available at the beginning of the game should be available also after one side
defects. The players, therefore, should renegotiate from the punishment we propose to a new
equilibrium with higher payoff for both players thus wrecking our original trigger strategy equilbrium.
Other authors have adopted different perspectives on re-negotiation (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991,
Ch. 5 for a literature review). Because this literature is still in flux and especially because purely game-
theoretic analyses of re-negotiation abstracts from institutions that would influence the re-negotiation
in the husband-wife relationship we consider (e.g. the importance of male pride and the shame brought
upon a man who has been cheated upon by his wife), we do not adopt any of the existing approaches to
re-negotiation.
16 When cheating entai1s a loss the extra gain obtained by a cheating women is smaller than the loss
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Consider the trigger strategy according to which a husband offers his wife the right to
buy his share of output at a price (p - d * ), let her stay in Pointe- N oire and continue
her proeessing and trade in fish given that she does not invest money in independent
companies and sends her back to Benin if such fïnancing is ever observed. A wife' s
strategy calls for only financing her husband if she is allowed a deduction equal to d*
and for financing independent companies if the deduction is smaller than d*. Wil the
trigger strategy make up a Nash-equilibrium?
To address this question the deduction d* that wil be offered by the husband must be
determined. The proposition below present the relation between the lowest deduction
for which the wife's best response is to finanee her husband only.
Proposition: Assume that 8 E (0,1). The optimal deduction, that is the smallest
deduction for which the wife's best response is to finanee her husband only, is
d* = d(p,q,r, w,ß,8,t,ka). The deduction d is monotonically decreasing in
r,q,8,t and ka and monotonically increasing in p, w and ß .
Proof" To show that a wife cannot gain by financing an independent company one
period if offered d*, denote by Vcw the present value of lifetime expected income for a
co-operative wife who restricts herself to finanee her husband and denote by V; the
incurred by her husband. It is thus not possible for a women to compensate her husband for every loss
he experiences due to the establishment of an independent company. Independent companies thus
threaten the interests of the husband.
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lifetime expected income of a defecting wife who finances an independent company
once. The wife's lifetime expected incomes are:
'"
Vcw = (q-(p-d))r¿x;bl
1=0
VdW = qrx:, + (q - (p - d))rxg + bWI-b
The lifetime expected income for a co-operative wife, Vc w , is the sum of an infinite
power series. This power series is a valid representation of the woman's discounted
income function given that its limit exists and is equal to the woman's income
function. According to the ratio test for convergence, the infinite series
c bl~ c
",'" c ';1 l"'d d h l. Xi+1 i l. xi+1 1 h
L.1i=1 Xl u converges to a imit provi e t at 1m -( or 1m - -( - w enI~'" XC bl i~'" XC bi
A . h . f" k k l L . . xlc+1 = 1 -- ~. Tt ~ 00. s time approae es in inity, i = 1+1 = ~, resu ting in "' heß x; b
power series converges.
A wife wil not finanee an independent company given that Vcw :; V/ . Substituting
and rearranging yields that a wife' s best response is to restrict herself to finanee her
husband given that:
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5 i
1-5 w+qrxod* ?: 00 - (q - p)
r" XC 51 - rxdL. 1 o
1=0
the properties of d* can be derived from this expression (see appendix)-
Under a trigger strategy the wife is motivated to finanee only her husband by the
premium over her reservation income leve1 received as a processor and trader in fish
and by the stick of being sent back to Benin. If the induced difference between the
present values of the lifetime expected income of a wife placed in Pointe-Noire and
Benin is higher than the one-period gain from in ve sting in an independent company,
the best response of a wife is to restrict herse1f to finanee her husband. As a result the
optimal deduction decreases as the wife can gain less by cheating (lower x~ and xg )
compared to the gain obtained by investing in her husband's activity. The gains
obtained by cheating and by co-operation is influenced by the form of the produetion
functionj. The more concave the production function, the higher the first period gains
obtained by cheating. Furthermore, the lower the cost associated with buying the fish
from her husband (lower local market price, p), the lower the wife's alternative
income (lower w) and the more she gains by coming to the Congo (higher r and higher
q) the smaller the optimal deduction. 17 The required deduction decreases also the
17 If the share, r, is sufficiently low, a wife's income from acting as a trader in Congo may be lower
than her alternative income in Benin. This may be the reason why so few workers (receivingonly
i-(1-r) of total output, where n denotes the number of workers in the company) are married or have
n
brought their wives to the Congo.
28
smaller the capital deduction, ß, and the more the woman values future incomes
(higher ö).
For the trigger strategy to constItute a Nash-equilibrium, each owner/husband should
find it optimal to let his wife buy his output at a reduced price every period. If he
chooses to keep to the contraet to seIl her the fish at a reduced price each period, his
period income is equal to (p - d)rx; . Ifhe refuses to fulfi the contract his income for
the first period is equal to prx~ , but his income every succes sive period is reduced to
prx~ . The man's lifetime expected incomes are given by,
O(
Vcm = (p -d)r ¿x;ö/
/=0
O(Vm c '" d 5;/d = prxo + pr L.x/ u
1=1
As time goes towards infinity X/d goes towards zero.
Given that his lifetime expected income is higher by keeping the contract than the
lifetime expected income by breaking it, the husband wil choose to sell the fish to his
wife at a reduced price every period. On the equilibrium path the condition amounts to
a price deduction low enough, that is,
XC
d* s P 1 - O( o
¿x;ö/
/=0
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The larger the difference between lifetime expected output deri ved by a continuously
investment-enhanced capital stock compared to a one-time enhanced capital stock,
the larger the scope of a price deduction. More specifically, the scope of a price
deduction is larger the higher the local price, p, the higher the investment, t, the
small er the depreciation rate, ß, and the higher the discount factor,5 .
For these strategies to be a Nash-equilibrium,
XC
P 1- 00 o
¿x:51
1=0
-g J1 + Xi
¿ d* ¿ h5 r q O
00
"xC51 _XdL. 1 O
1=0
(q - p)
For a d* in the specified range the man wil find it optimal to seIl the fish to his wife
at the reduced price and the wife wil find it optimal to finanee her husband only. In
order to maximise his income the man wil choose the smallest deduction possible,
that is he wil choose d* equal to the right hand side of the above equation.
By seeing the economic dispositions of Popo men and women in a longer
perspective, the existing organisation which is characterised by Popo men seIling their
share of the catch to their wives at a reduced price and receiving credit from their
wives in return, is shown to be an optimal arrangement from both the men's and the
women's point of view. The arrangement is optimal given the legally differential
access regime prevailing between men and women which restricts access to working
capital and thereby to fish for men only. Furthermore, the migrant status of the Popo
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population in Congo coupled with the fact that only men have obtained residenee and
work permits, give husbands the means necessary to uphold the legally differential
access regime.
The importanee of controIlng the working capital also explain why women are
delegated the role of proeessors and traders in fish. Since the differential access
between owners and workers is technologically based, a worker being able to
accumulate enough capital has the right and the ability to become an owner. The more
workers are transferred into owners, the harder the competition for labour and fish.
The more new owners, the higher the replacement co st of the primary owners. And
the smaller the pool of workers, the more each owner would have to offer the workers
in order to attraet their labour, and the less the capital share. Furthermore, the higher
the number of operating companies, the smaller the average catch per company.
Established owners, therefore, have no interest in letting male Popo workers establish
themselves as fish-traders accumulating capita!. SeIlng the fish to the wives prevents
such a development.
SeIling it to them at a reduced price makes it more attractive for the women to direct
their investments towards their husband' s companies. Reducing the price, however, is
only one way of achieving this. The husbands could alternatively seIl at the local
market price and attraet the credit by paying their wives an interest rate somewhat
above the market rate. However, in marine societies where catch variability has a very
profound impact on monthly income leveIs, a price reduction has the benefit of
relating "interest" payments directly to catch leveis. In a "price reduction" situation
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the woman has the right to a given share of the catch determined income. The man is
thus secured from having to pay high "interest" when income is low. In an interest
payment situation on the other hand, there might be a tendency for catch levels and
interest payments to vary in opposite directions. When catehes are low, the women
have less money to lend out, and other members of society often need to borrow to
cover consumption requirements. The higher the demand relative to supply, the higher
the interest rate and the more expensive it become for husbands/owners to pay interest
in excess of the market rate.
The existing social and economic organisation is thus explicable as the outcome of
rational economic considerations by the individuals, given the insecurities existing
and the access regimes prevailing in the society.
Conclusion
The social organisation of Popo society, characterised by men being fishermen and
women fish-traders has been shown to be optimal from the point of view of the male
capital owners. By defining working capital, and thereby the fish itself, as legally
inaccessible to married women, the men create a legally differentiated access regime
between men and women. The husband' s ability to send any wife not abiding by the
husband-wife rules back to Benin maintains this legally differentiated access regime.
The legally differentiated access regime between men and women, in combination
with the technologically differentiated access regime existing between owners and
workers and the fact that fishing and trading are competing activities, make it optimal
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for the owners to seIl the fish to their wives at a reduced price. The wives on her side,
knowing that the only way to stay in business is to abide by her husband' s restrictions
on her credit giving, finds it optimal to do so since abiding by the restrictions
maximises her expected lifetime income.
Important insight generated by the analysis is how particular institutions exist as
means serving the economic interests of dominant groups in the society. Dominant in
the sense that they can prevent others from participating in the productive activities of
the society on same terms as they participate themselves. In Pop o society at Pointe-
Noire men den y women the right to possess working capital, thus creating a legally
differentiated access regime between men and women. In combination with the
technologically differentiated access regime existing between owners and workers, the
existent institutional order is show n to be the order best serving the interests of the
owners. Contrary to North (1990; 6) who primarily sees institutions as "constraints
human impose on themselves in order to reduce uncertainty and facilitate interaction",
institutions in our view may just as well be devices created by human beings in order
to facilitate some person's interests at the expense of others.
Following this line of reasoning our analysis demonstrates that it is important to
reveal not only "the conditions under which co-operation exist" (North, 1990: 14) but
also the form the co-operation takes when analysing the institutional set-up in a
society. By investigating whether co-operation wil be mutually beneficial or benefit
some groups more than others due to one part being able to define the co-operative
terms, new insight into the institutional setting can be gained. To accommodate the
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analysis, the prevailng access regime should be specified, since the origin of the
observed institution may be traced through the access regime. 
18
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Appendix: The effect of changes in exogenous variables on the optimal price
deduction.
o w i
d* = ;:6 r + qxo _ (q _ p)
'" c s:/ d
~x/u -xo
/=0
An increase in the price p increases the optimal price deduction.
8d* =1;:0
8p
An increase in the price q reduces the optimal price deduction given that the total
catch the first period if the woman defects is smaller than the discounted stream of
catehes if she co-operates. This condition is assumed fulfiled.
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An increase in the share r reduces the optimal price deduction.
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An increase in the reservation incorne w increases the optimal price deduction.
Bd*
Bw
=
LlI-ò r ? O
00
'" c s:1 d
L. 
Xl U - Xo
1=0
An increase in the depreciation rate p increases the optimal price deduction.
Bd* - fol BJ (-t(l- p)t- ko - ft(l- py-i tJ(N)1=1 Bki 1=1 O2 ?D=Bp
h N-wò iW ere - i-I-ò +qxo and 00D = '" XC OL - xdL. i o
1=0
An increase in the woman' stime discount factor o decrease the optimal price
deduction given that the ratio between the marginal change in the discounted value of
the woman's reservation income level and the marginal change in the discounted
stream of catehes, is smaller than the ratio N/D. As long as it was profitable to co-
operate at the original discount factor, an increase in this factor wIl decrease the
deduction needed to make co-operation optimal from the agent's point of view.
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